Religious non-literacy in a literate culture

Introduction

Ethnic groups

Language

Religious non-leteracy in a literate culture

Folklore and folk music

Folk music and instruments

Settlement patterns

Life cycle

The inward looking society

IN NO INSTITUTION does the disparate attitudinal dichotomy of literate vs. non-literate have as much cogency or meaning as it does in religion. Islam is not a simple "conversion or the sword" doctrine. The roots of Islam were watered in the same philosophical and geographical garden as Judaism and Christianity. Muslims consider Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians ahl-i-kitab ("people of the Book," i.e., those with divinely inspired written scriptures).

The same wall dividing Judaism from Christianity also splits Christianity from Islam: the role and nature of Christ. The Jews still wait for the Messiah; the Christians have Christ as their personal Saviour and the Divine Son of God; the Muslims, however, simply look on Jesus (or ‘Isa) as the Prophet before Mohammad.

Islam developed out of the Judaic-Christian matrix, theoretically eliminating (at least for the Muslim) contradictions in the earlier theological mathematics (one plus one plus one equals one). To the Muslim, only Allah (roughly, "the God") is divine. He is the Yahweh or Jehovah of the Jew and Christian. Like all organized religions, Islam has a codified system of ritual (commonly called the Five Pillars of Islam) for initiation and permanent identification.

 

1. Shahadat ("profession of faith"): A single statement by which a man identifies himself as, or becomes, a Muslim:

"Ashhadu anna la ilaha illa llahu, wa anna Muhammadan rasulu-llah"

"I give witness that there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah."

Most Afghans prefer a shortened version:

"La-ilaha-illa-llah, wa Muhammad rasulu-llah"

Muslims attribute no divinity to Mohamnmd; he is simply a prophet or messenger. Therefore, Muslims insist they not be called "Mohammedans," for this term, by analogy With the "Christ" in "Christianity," seems to them to imply divine attributes in the Prophet.

 

2. Salah ("prayer"): After ritual ablutions, devout Afghan Muslims pray facing Mecca, five times each day: dawn (sahar), noon (gharma) or early afternoon (maspakheen), when the shadow of a pole equals one-fifth of its height or before the length of a man’s shadow equals his height), mid-afternoon (mazdigar), dusk (makham) and early evening, before retiring (maskhotan). All these terms are in general use in Afghanistan; they vary in other Muslim countries.

The Hanafi call to prayer in Afghanistan is:

Allah o akbar Allah oakbar (God is most great)

Allah o akbar Allah o akbar

Ashhadu anna la ila2ha illa-l1ah (I testify that there is no God but Allah)

Ashhadu anna la ilaha illa-llah

Ashhadu anna Muhammad rasulu-llah (I testify that Mohatnmad is the Messenger of God)

Ashhadu anna Muhammad rasulu-llah

Hayya ‘lla. ‘s-sala (Come to prayer)

Hayya ‘lla ‘s-sala

Hayya ‘ala ‘1-f alah (Come to prosperity)

Hayya ‘ala ‘1-f alah

Allah o akbar Allah o akbar

La illaha illallah

In some larger cities, public address systems and even recorded calls to prayer have been recently introduced, although not to the extent to which they are found in Pakistan and Iran.

 

3. Zak-at ("almsgiving"): Considered a purifying act. Every Muslim should annually give a certain percentage of his negotiable, debt-free wealth to the poor, either directly or indirectly. In Afghanistan, the traditional amount is two and a half percent. The custom of zakat helps account for the tolerance of beggars in the Muslim world; they are necessary to the individual who wants to see where his charity goes and is not content simply to send a check to a mass-media once. Zekat also partly justifies the lack of taxation for social welfare in certain areas of the Muslim world.

 

4. Sawm ("fasting," called rujah or ruzah in Afghanistan): Although widely practiced throughout the Muslim world, the ritual fasting during Ramzan (Ramadan) cannot be justified from a careful study of the Qor’an. Ramzan occurs in the ninth month of the Muslim religious calendar. From sunrise (theoretically when a white thread can be distinguished from a black thread, but now astronomically determined in most areas) to sundown (white thread and black thread indistinguishable), no food, liquid, tobacco, chars (marihuana), opium, or other foreign bodies, even spittle, may pass the lips of the true believer (Pickthall, 1954, 49; Quran, Surah 11:187). The dawn is called sahari, sunset iftar. The month of fasting follows the lunar calendar and therefore occurs eleven days earlier each year, which creates great hardships for the devout, when Ramzan falls in summer.

Exempts from the fast are suckling children, travelers, soldiers in the field, the sick, the pregnant. All but the children, however, must make up lost days at other times of the year.

In most towns and villages, a mullah’s call to prayer begins and ends the fast. Today in many areas of the Muslim world government-sponsored mullah announce the new moon over the radio, which annually causes arguments among members of the religions community about the validity of the audible pronouncement of a visual sighting. In Kabul, the cannon on Sher Darwaza hill (which announces noon daily) is fired an hour before sunrise, so that those fasting may get up and eat; the second time the cannon fires, people stop eating. The cannon also announces the end of fasting in Kabul. Most Afghans break the daily fast by first eating dates or raisins, excellent quick energy food, before con-sinning mountains of pilau and gallons of tea.

The fasting ends with three days of celebrations called Little ‘Id (id-il-Fitr, ‘id-i-Ram zan, in Turkic Shaher-i-Bairam, and in Pashto, Qamqai Akhtar). Most people (especially the children) get new clothing, and friends visit one another. Little Id begins on the first of Shawwal, Muslim lunar calendar.

An optional fast day is ‘Ashura’, 10th of Muharram, or Martyrs’ Day, primarily a Shi’a festival. It lasts from sunset to sunset. Many important historical events presumably occurred on ‘Ashura’. Jews celebrated the holiday as their Day of Atonement long before Islam. Noah supposedly disembarked from the ark on ‘Ashura’. In Islam, Husain (grandson of the Prophet Mohammad) was killed on October 10, 680; his body lies buried in Kerbala, Iraq, and his head is honored in Cairo at the Mosque of the Hasanain. The sizable Shia populations in Iran and Pakistan hold large celebrations on ‘Ashura’, little observed in Afghanistan, however, because of its small Shia minority.

 

5. Hajj ("pilgrimage"): All Muslims are supposed to make a pilgrimage to the sacred city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Those who make the trip are called Hajji and enjoy a respected status throughout the Muslim word. The traditional time to make the Hajj is Dhu’I Hijra, the twelfth month in the Muslim lunar calendar. Mecca had been a holy pilgrimage place long before Mohammad, and he simply adopted the custom for Muslim usage. Today, many Afghans annually fly to Mecca, primarily with the national airlines, Anana Afghan Airlines. In April/May, 1968, 216 Afghan pilgrims made the Hajj to Mecca in a 14-bus caravan, which included medical and cooking facilities. In 1969 and again in 1970, 1,500 pilgrims made the trip in buses, 5,000 by air.

The major festival during the Hajj is the ritual slaying of sheep on the tenth day of Dhu’I Hijra or ‘Id al-Kabir, Big ‘Id, also called ‘Id-i-Qurban or, in Turkish, buyuk bairarn. The day is also called ‘Id-i-Duha or ‘Id-i-Adha (or Azha) in Afghanistan. Of the slaughtered sheep, one third goes to the sacrificer’s family, one third to kin, one third to the poor. The ritual slaying is in memory of Abraham’s slaying of a sheep in place of Isaac at the command of Allah. The festival usually lasts four days, but is a less festive occasion than Little ‘Id because of the solemnity of the memorial situation. During ‘Id-i-Q urban friends usually exchange presents.

 

The final important religious holiday is the birthday of the Prophet Mohammad (‘Id-i-Milad-i-Nabi), which occurs on the twelfth day of Rabi’ ul-awal. The Prophet also died on this day, which increases its importance and solemnity.

Nawruz, March 21 (1 Hamal on the Afghan solar calendar), the first day of spring, is also the first day of the Afghan New Year, an important festival, and ecologically more consistent than the wintery January 1 of the Christian world. The Achaemenids shifted nawruz from the summer equinox (June 21) to the vernal equinox (March 21), according to Wilber (1958a). Another logical time-keeping device used in Afghanistan is that the new day begins at sundown, instead of at midnight. This confuses foreigners occasionally, because when an Afghan invites you to his home on Friday night it would be Thursday night in the Western way of reckoning.

When nawruz begins, ‘Ajuzak, an ugly old woman, roams abroad. She may be the ugly aspect of the matrilineal spiritual base of all societies. If it rains on nawruz, ‘Ajuzak is washing her hair, and the spring planting will prosper. Another version is that ‘Ajuzak has a swing and if she falls to the left on nawruz it will be a dry year; if to the right, wet. Infants must be hidden away from the evil eye of ‘Ajuzak to prevent illness.

In addition to the comforting oneness of universal group rituals, a codified way of life must be spelled out in detail for the faithful in an organized religion. Often, as in Christianity, the flock should try to emulate the life of the founder. Later interpretations expand, elaborate, and "modernize." Mohammad never claimed divinity or even perfection, although many later Muslim theologians, in competition with the Christians over the goodness of Christ, claimed human perfection for the Prophet.

The codified beliefs of organized, literate Islam are found in the Qor’an. the Hadith, and the Shari’at, all interpreted by men who attempt to divine Allah’s message and will, men appointed either by themselves or those in religion-secular power.

In attempts to find analogies between Christianity and Islam, some have equated Mohammad with Jesus, the Bible with the Qor’an. Possibly better pairs would be St. Paul and Mohammad (both were Prophets announcing the arrival of the "message"); Jesus and the Qor’an (the messages); the Bible with the Hadith (interpretations and elaborations of the message).

Mohammad received the Quran from Gabriel who, along with the Archangel Michael, are only two of the many dramatis personae found in both the Bible and the Quran. A partial list includes the following (the four major prophets, Shari!, before ‘Isa and Mohammad are identifled with *):

Quran              Bible

Adam*              Adam

Nuh*                 Noah

Thrahim*          Abraham

Tshak                Isaac

Musa*               Moses

Ya’kub              Jacob

Irmiya               Jeremiah

‘Ayub               Job

Yusuf               Joseph

Yusha’             Joshua

Yahya              John the Baptist

 

I have already mentioned the role of ‘Isa (Christ) in Islam. In addition Muslims believe in the virgin birth, and greatly revere Maryam (Mary).

To the Muslim, the Qor’an is the word of God, not Mohammad just as, to Jews and Christians, the Ten Commandments are the word of God, not Moses.

The Hadith (actions and traditions or sayings of the Prophet) supplement the Qor’an. Often, Hadith resemble the parables so familiar to Christians. The most reliable Hadith come from the Companions of Mohammad. Christ had his Disciples, who developed His image and passed it on to Europe; Mohammad had his Companions divided into thirteen grades. Mohammad’s closest friends belonged to grade I; anyone catching a glimpse of the Prophet is in grade 13. Three categories of reliability arose, and naturally those farthest away from the Prophet became suspect. The term ashab loosely means "companion," and T. Hughes (1885, 24) estimates a total of 144,000 existed. The Hadith recorded immediately after the death of Mohammad are considered to be the most reliable, particularly when written by a Companion, first grade, in this manner: "‘Ali [son-in-law of the Prophet] said, The Prophet, peace and blessings of Allah be on him [this, or a similar phrase, is always added after a mention of the Prophetl said: Obedience is due only to that which is good" (M. All, n.d., S97). In modern terms, this Hadith represents a clear call for civil disobedience when secular law violates the essence of the "absolute good." Many instances are cited to justify the Hadith. For example, Khalid, a troop commander, ordered his officers to execute some prisoners. The Qfficers refused, and the Prophet later approved their action (M. Au, n.d., 397).

Gibb (1949, 79) indicates that al-Bukhari (d. A.D. 870, an early Hadith collector) may have examined at least 200,000 Hadith, out of which he approved 7,300 (actually only 2,762 if duplicates are eliminated).

The Hadith have often been used to justify non-Muslim customs later adopted by specific groups. Hadith stretch credulity when quoted thus:

"Abu Kuraib said to us that Ibrahim ibn Yusuf ibn Abi Ishaq said to us from his father from Abu Ishaq from Tulata ibn Musarif, that he said, I have heard from Bara ibn Azib that he said, I have heard that the Prophet said, Who ever shall give in charity a milch cow, or silver, or a leathern bottle of water, it shall be equal to the freeing of a slave" (Coon, 1951b, 99).

Theologians usually accepted those Hadith with an unbroken word-of-mouth chain connected by a maximum of five links. Any break in the chain made the Hadith unreliable. Many Hadith, obviously later accretions and designed to justify different interpretations of Islam, partly led to the creation of the separate Shari’at, or Codes of Theological Law.

Islam, like Christianity, is divided into two major sects, born primarily because of disputes over political succession, rather than religious differences. The problem of succession to the leadership of the Muslim community’ arose after the death of the Prophet Mohammad in 632. One group thought the leader (Khalifa, or Caliph) should be elected from the Quraish tribe of the Prophet; another thought ‘Au should succeed his father-in-law (Mohammad left no male heirs); yet another group opposed the establishment of any formalized leadership institution.

The first three caliphs were companions and age peers of the Prophet Mohammad, members of the Quraish, and kin related to him in one way or another: Abu Bakr (632-34), the father of the Prophet Mohammad’s favorite wife, ‘A’isha; ‘Umar (634-44), father of the Prophet Mohammad’s wife Hafsa; ‘Uthman (644-56), the Prophet’s fifth cousin and son-in-law, who married two of Mohammad’s daughters.

With the murder of ‘Uthman, the mantle of Caliph fell on ‘All (656-61) son-in-law, cousin, and foster brother of the Prophet Mohammad. During ‘All’s short reign, the already shaky Muslim Empire began to disintegrate in a disastrous process of political fission. Within a quarter of a century after the death of its founder, therefore, Islam began to crumble as a cohesive political force.

Islam quickly split into two major groupings: the Sunni and the Shi’a. Very roughly, the Sunni can be considered the orthodox line (sunna means "custom," or the way of life propounded by the Prophet), the Shi’a, as breakaway sects. Generally, the Shi’a repudiated the first three Caliphs, and accepted Ali and his line as the logical successors to the Prophet Mohammad. The Shi’a began to split among themselves, as did the Sunni, until three major sub-sects of the Shi’a survived, and four sub-sects of the Sunni, each attempting to justify its doctrinaire position through the medium of Hadith. So the Qar’an and Hadith, plus cammentaries (Tafsir) on the two, equaled the rise of the various Sunni and Shi’a. Shari’at, religiously oriented and inspired codes of law. By the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D., relatively rigid Shari’at set the pattern for the next 1,000 years.

The largest sub-sect of Shi’a Islam is found in Iran, where the Ithna ‘Ashariya ("the Twelvers’D dominates and is the official state religion. The Twelvers are also known as the Imami (Imam = caliph or religious leader). because they recognize twelve successive imams beginning with ‘All (Coon, 195 lb. 121). Other Imami live in Iraq and Afghahistan, particularly near the iranian border and in the Hazarajat, and in the urban centers where great numbers of Qizilbash reside.

The Zaidiya Shi’a rejected the fifth imam and, instead, accepted his brother Zaid as lmam. The Zaidiya dominate Yemen, but the present Imam. a direct descendant of Zaid, no longer sits on the throne, for a civil war rages as this book is written. If the Republican government gains total control, what will happen to the Zaidiya Shi’a religion? Will a new sect arise?. Will the government become completely secular and attempt to dismiss Islam as unimportant? Each political change in the near and Middle East brings about attendant changes in the dominant religion.

The Isma’iliya reject the sixth imam and accept Isma’il, the elder son of the fifth imam. After Isma’il’s son, Mohammad, substitute or "concealed" imams have succeeded one another, the real imams remaining invisible. The Muslim tradition of succession in a given family, but not necessarily according to primogeniture, was graphically and poignantly demonstrated when the Agha Khan III, spiritual, leader of the Isma’iliya, died in 1957, having first appointed a grandson, Karim, a Harvard graduate, Agha Khan IV, instead of his internationally famous playboy son, Au Khan.

The Isma’iliya have a wide geographic spread: Negro Africa, East Africa, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Many are important entrepreneurs, financiers, and bankers, and the Isma’iliya operate a fantastically successful welfare program, including education, public health, recreation, and insurance for believers. The objects (diamonds, gold, etc.) used annually to give the Agha Khan IV a birthday gift go to the welfare fund and not to his personal fortune.

Sunni Afghan villagers often look on neighboring Isma’iliya as "devil worshipers" because of their use of the peacock to symbolize the hidden Imam. The peacock represents the shaytan (devil) in the non-literate iconography of many Muslim areas. An Iraqi ethnic group called the Yazidi ("devil worshipers") by their neighbors call the peacock Malik Tawwus (King Peacock), and believe the peacock saved Christ from the cross (al-Jadaan, 1960).

Afghan Isma’iliya include many Wakhi (Nizaris), Shigni, Ishkamishi, Sanglechi, Munji, and Pamiri peoples of Badakhshan, as well as many Hazara, in spite of the common belief that all Hazara are Imami Shi’a.

The rest of the Afghans (aside from the Imami mentioned earlier), or about eighty percent of the total population, are Hanafi Sunni, also dominant in Pakistan, India, and Lower Egypt. In fact, the Hanafi Shari’a is the most common of the four sub-sects of Sunni Islam. The other three are the Maliki (North Africa, Upper Egypt, the Sudan); Shafi’i (Hadramaut and Indonesia); Hanbali (Saudi Arabia). The four schools vary only in interpretation of the Qor’an and Hadith, and do not concern themselves with the succession of imams. Only the extremely conservative, juristic Hanbali refuse to admit equality for the other three sub-sects of Sunni Islam.

To complicate the religious scene further, many Sufi tarika (or tarikat; plural, turuk; sub-subsects, "roads," or "pathways") occur within each Shari’a, some being founded as late as the early nineteenth century, for example, the Senusiya of Libya (Evans—Pritchard, 1949: L. Dupree, 1958b). Sub-subsects often redivided into branches (or sub to the third power sects): the Ahmadiya of Egypt (founded in the thirteenth century A.D.) initially proliferated to 16 branches, but now only three are active (Gibb and Kramers, 1953, 575).

Often a tarika revolves around local customs or cults integrated into the body of Islam; at other times, the personal charisma of a single man could shape the rules and ritual. Usually the tarika are associated with mystic Sufism. Of the about two hundred lanka founded in Islam since the ninth and tenth centuries, only about seventy-five are still active, including the Pir-Hadjat in Herat, whose basis is the life and writings of Ansari. Only two major lanka remain centralized in their areas of origin: the Senusiya in Libya and the Mawlawiya in Turkey. Most Pushtun follow the lanka of Pir Baba (also called Ghaus-ul Azam Dashtagir), whose real name was• Abdul Qadir al-Jilani, and who is buried in Baghdad.

Islam has given much to the West, and during the so-called Dark Ages of Europe. (fifth to thirteenth centuries )—although they were not so dark as once painted—the Muslim world made great and lasting contributions to medicine, philosophy, geography, literature, painting, architecture, and mathematics (Southern, 1962). The West currently uses a modified system of Arabic numerals (Wright, 1952).

All these ritualized aspects and codified beliefs can be destroyed or modified without destroying the essence of Islam, with Soviet Central Asia as a classic example (Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967; Nova and Newth, 1967; Pipes, 1955; G. Wheeler, 1966). Islam lives in the Muslim republics of the U.S.S.R.; tile ethics remain, more or less, even after the ritual has become atrophied.

The essence of Islam stripped of turgid liturgicism and Hadith-baiting reduces itself to three major themes: belief in Allah, the equality of men before Allah (not necessarily before other men), and social justice (the right of a man to live among other men and exploit his talents). From another viewpoint, the essence of Islam defines man’s relationships to the universe (order does exist), man’s relationship to God (all men are equal in the eyes of Allah), and man’s relationship to man (social justice).

Contrary to popular belief among most westerners and many literate Muslims, the essence of Islam (as interpreted by Modernists) is not fatalistic or predetertninistic. Insha’Iiah-"If God Wills"-a common Muslim expression, seems to imply divine manipulation which can be neither changed nor influenced. The term "Islam" means "submission," but not blind submission to a computerized fate programed by an impassive source. On the contrary, a Muslim submits to a way of life (or essence) after careful examination.

Islam in essence is not a backward, anti-progressive, anti-modern religion, although many of its interpreters, the human, action component, may be backward and anti-progressive. Religions interpreted by man constantly change in day-to-day functioning, but their essence remains unchanged and unchanging. Christianity, for example, embraces existentialism, the Ecumenical Council, and the snake-cults of the hills of the American South. The essence remains the same; only interpretations differ. Here literate and non-literate Afghans find themselves poles apart.

The Islam practiced in Afghan villages, nomad camps, and most urban areas (the ninety to ninety-five percent non-literates) would be almost unrecognizable to a sophisticated Muslim scholar. Aside from faith in Allah and in Mohammad as the Messenger of Allah, most beliefs relate to localized, pre-Muslim customs. Some of the ideals of Afghan tribal society run counter to literate Islamic principles. The Pushtunwali (traditional code of the Pushtun hills) for example, demands blood vengeance, even on fellow Muslims, contradicting Sura 4:92-93:

"It is not for a believer to kill a believer unless it be by mistake. He who bath killed a believer by mistake must set free a believing slave, and pay the blood-money to the family of the slain, unless they remit it as a charity" (Pickthall, 1954, 88).

In practice (but not in theory) Islam loosely accepts "saints," and the cults of saints, although forbidden, abound throughout the Muslim world. Almost any stone thrown in Afghanistan will hit the shrine (ziarat) of a pir, khwajah, or other name-saint. Pilgrims flock to ziarat to ask for the intercession of a particular saint with Allah for specific favors. In Afghanistan, for example, a saint’s tomb near Jalalabad specializes in curing insanity; another near Charikar cures mad-dog bites; and in the valley of Paiminar, just north of Kabul, are forty-odd shrines, all dedicated to fertility. Women desiring children visit Paiminar to .buy amulets (ta’wiz) from the ziarat caretakers, each guaranteeing a son or daughter as the case may be. At one tomb, women actually fondle the bones of shahed (Muslim martyrs, particularly those killed in warfare against non-Muslims) and eat a pinch of earth, probably reflecting a very ancient belief in impregnation from mother earth.

The caretakers of the various shrines throughout Afghanistan sell ta’wiz for practically anything a man or woman might desire: control over a loved one; increased sexual prowess; protection from bullets in a feud; general good luck; protection from the evil eye, and others. Many ta’wiz consist simply of magical formulas or verses copied from the Qor’an, which are folded and sealed in a cloth, leather, or metal triangular or square packet, and then sewn to the clothing of the purchaser.

Supplicants use several devices to remind the saint of their requests. Usually an object is left behind: a lighted candle, a piece of cloth tied to a pole, a ball of clay to harden in the sun. At the Ashukhan and Arafan shrine in Kabul, believers drive nails into the threshold. Driving nails into selected trees scattered throughout Afghanistan (the shrine of Khwajah Ansari near Herat, for instance, and another near Chahardeh-i-Ghorband) can achieve cure for toothaches. Often women will leave small toy charpayi (string beds) or construct small hammocks at fertility shrines to remind the saint to intercede. In addition to purchasing ta’wiz, pilgrims leave money with the caretaker to help support the shrine.

A special festival (jandah bala kardan, "raising of the standard"), held on nawruz at the tomb of Hazrat ‘Ali in Mazar-i-Sharif, offers the faithful a chance to gain religious merit. The standard of ‘Au is raised in the courtyard of the shrine and the devout scramble over one another to touch its staff. Those who touch the staff first gain extra merit. The jandah (standard) remains standing for forty days, and thousands of pugnims visit the shrine. Many sick and crippled persons tOuch the pole, hoping for a miraculous cure (N. Dupree, 1967a, 54).

Another Mazar-i-Sharif festival with pre-Muslim fertility connotations occurs about -forty days after nawruz, when the standard comes down. At this time, a distinct red species of tulip blooms and disappears shortly after. People visit friends and wish each other long and happy lives and large families. Any pre-Muslim ritual accompanying the birth and death of the red tulip has long been forgotten.

Several thousand white pigeons live in the shrine complex of the Sharif ‘Au in Mazar-i-Sharif.. Afghans believe that one in seven is a spirit (arwa’) so they feed the pigeons when they visit the shrine, hoping to gain religious merit points. If a man kills one of the pigeons in which the arwa’ resides the arwa’ will return to haunt his dreams.

Many other examples of non-Islamic practices can be cited (I. A. Shah, 1928): black magic, shamanism, and types of voodoo (sticking sharp objects into dolls, for example) are practiced, and witches (kojtarha), usually old women past childbearing age, exist throughout the country, and are occasionally killed. The witch not only uses wax, clay, and other materials to represent the victims, but incorporates the victim’s hair, or fingernail- or toenail-parings into the effigy. Even dirt from under the nails can be used, and villagers have told me that they bury their shorn hair and parings in secret.

Parents frighten small children by saying that a wicked witch named madar ‘ol will steal them away if they are disobedient.

The practitioner of black magic (seher) relies on the assistance of arwa’-yi-khabisah or arwa’-yi-palid (unclean ‘spirits). Positive and negative charms and spells exist in the realm of religio-magic.

When black magic exists in a village or camp, white magic must be on hand to fight the evil. Often the mullah (Islamic religious leader) will serve as a shaman to counter the black magic. In fact, he may know these better than he does formal Islamic rites. Charms and spells are usually referred to respectively as nun (Arabic for heavenly light; and nan (Arabic for fire, also associated with shaytan, Satan). Bullets which have wounded but not killed, for instance, are positive charms and have great prophylactic, protective powers, and Afghan warriors .pay high prices for them.

Several supernatural creatures harass the Afghan. The jinn, indefinable spirits, try io possess the living; some are evil, some merely jokers, but a person possessed by a jinn must be exorcised, because jinn are considered to be the main cause of insanity. Impersonal spirits created from smokeless fires, jinn return to fire as man does to dust, and infest all Afghanistan, causing mischief, such as tripping people in the dark and causing disease. The jinn replaces the scientific "germ" for the non-literate Afghan.

Arwa’, spirits or ghosts, tortured souls of the improperly-buried dead, or those cursed by Allah or man, can be visible or invisible, and take either human or non-human form. Pan are beautiful fairies, who fly from the Caucasus to steal bad children for slaves. Dehyu, bohyu, ugly giants (with horns, tails, and thick hides), protect the pan from the evil eyes of man. Savvid, in this sense referring to the souls of pious men, return to earth to warn evildoers to repent. They can take any shape. including human.

A special group of individuals called malang wander about the coun3ryside. They are holy men thought to be touched by the hand of Allah. Some go naked, moving with the season; others dress in women’s clothes; still others wear elaborate, often outlandish, concoctions of their own design. Usually Afghan, Iranian, Pakistani, or Indian Sufi Muslims, malang travel from place to place, fed, honored, and at times feared by the local population, or 4 least held in awe. Often, they spout unintelligible gibberish, words they claim to be from Allah or a local saint. At other times, they quote from the Qor’an, usually incorrectly. The malang seem to be decreasing in number as Afghan society becomes more mobile, and modern processes give wider latitude for dissidents to adjust to new occupational opportunities outside the village and nomadic camp. The malang visually symbolizes the smouldering ‘dissidence which often burns in individuals and which group action suppresses in the tightly ‘knit peasant-tribal society of Afghanistan.

Since no one willingly leaves the protective matrix of the socio-economic relationships of kin and village, the malang must (in the Afghan view) have been touched by the hand of God, and, therefore, be tolerated. He is another example of the wonder and power of Allah. Sometimes a malang performs a local miracle and settles down in a specific village, often under a large tree. When he dies the villagers build a ziarat around his tomb, and he becomes their very own saint, a pin to intercede personally for them, thus bringing a more localized, personalized meaning to their religious lives.

The traditionalists feed fuel to the peasant-tribal beliefs in predestination, aided and abetted by religious leaders on every level. Those at the bottom of the hierarchy, the village mullah, often non-literate farmers, often function as part time religious leaders. Technically, Islam has no organized clergy, and every man can be a mullah. Anyone can lead in prayer. But where two men exist, hierarchies rise, and so they did in Muslim countries. At times informal, but often formally associated with the power elite, ‘ulama (bodies of religious leaders) assisted the rulers of city-states, tribal groups, or empires to maintain control over the masses, and interpreted the law.

Thus the essentially non-Islamic belief of the non-literate Muslim that Allah planned all in advance excuses tyrahny, and prepares men to accept whatever fate hands them.

The Afghan Jam’iyat ul-’ulama, founded in 1931 by King Mohammad Nadir Shah, originally had seventeen members, usually one chief religious leader from each province. In its heyday, the ‘ulama advised the executive and legislative branches on Islamic matters, literally controlling the courts and the schools, as well as watching over and commenting on public and private morality and customs. After Mohammad Daoud Khan became Prime Minister in 1953, however, the political power of the ‘ulama began to wane.

The government-paid hierarchy of religious leaders remains substantially as created by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1896, when he abolished most waqf (religious trusts) and transferred their holdings to government control. Waqf usually support mosques, schools, hospitals, or other religiously oriented institutions with the income derived from land or shops donated in perpetuity by devout Muslims. Often, the donor would continue to receive the income from the property during his lifetime, the funds reverting to the waqf at his death. Occasionally, individuals or families donated land or buildings for use by a trust.

Sometimes, both the religious leaders administering the waqf and the donor violated the intent of the trust by diverting a least part of the income to their personal use. Since waqf are exempt from taxation, the government lost considerable revenue, which partly accounts for Abdur Rahman’s seizure of many waqf, and his demand that the rest account publicly’ for all expenditures.

The imam jum’a or khatib (orator who delivers the Friday sermon. khutba) sits at the top of the hierarchy and serves as religious leader to the large masjid-i-jum’a or masjid-i-jami’ (Friday mosque) of the big cities. Kabul has about twenty tnasjid-i-jum’a and a hundred or so minor mosques (Wilber, 1962, 68), served by two lesser grades of imam. Afghanistan has a total of about 15,000 mosques, according to Wilber.

The government appoints an imam after consultation with local religious leaders and, in principle, secular authorities cannot dismiss an i,na~n.

The muezzin (mu’adhdhin) calls the congregation to prayer. Any Muslim, however, can give the call to prayer, and the government-paid muezzin works only in the cities and larger towns, functioning as an assistant to the imam (Wilber, 1952).

The khadim works as caretaker and janitor at the mosque and, although paid by the government, usually expects baksheesh from worshippers and visitors.

Mudaris are teachers of religious subjects at mosques, madrasa (religious schools), paid either by the government or privately. Those with the title Qar’i Sahib can recite the Qor’an well; anyone knowing the Qor’an by heart (often blind men) is referred to as Liafiz.

The qazi (mentioned earlier and to be discussed in detail later), although paid by the government, remain outside the religious hierarchy but are deeply entrenched in the government hierarchy. They function as judges for the Ministry of Justice. Slowly and irrevocably, however, secular law is replacing the orthodox decisions of the qazi.

Several honorific titles, some inherited, some achieved, are in common usage in Afghanistan: Sheikh-ul-Islam, a title reserved for renowned mystics and members of the ‘ulama, once bestowed exclusively by the Caliphs of Baghdad; Maulana, the usual title given in Afghanistan to a member of the ‘ulama, a renowned mystic, or a great scholar in Islamic studies; Khwajah, the title of a teacher leaving 1?ehind a school of followers, or a brotherhood (often such men become saints after death); Hazrat, a title for respected religious leaders who are primarily, though not necessarily, scholars. Among the more noted recent religious leaders in Afghanistan are the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar (a member of the Mujadldi family, which arrived in Afghanistan from Chinese Sinkiang after the post-World War I, anti-communist Basmachi revolts), and the Sayyid-i-Kayan, who maintains tight control in the eastern Hazarajat. In some villages, the title Hazrat refers to those who consider themselves descendants of ‘Uthman, the third caliph; in others of ‘Uman, the seventh caliph.

The most common religious term is Sayyid (Sa’adát, plural) referring to the descendants of the Prophet, who are therefore descendants of Fatima and Ali. Both Sunni and Shi’a Sa’adat exist.

Klioja (Arabic; also means eunuch. so Afghans use Khwalah in Farsi), in north Afghanistan, refers to those who claim to be the descendants of Abu Bakr, the first caliph.

The utilization and function of these honorific terms vary throughout the Muslim world and even inside Afghanistan.

In spite of the increase of secularization since 1953, religious leaders still maintain their extra-curricular vested interests: many own extensive tracts of land (often disguised as waqf); most have local political influence; others control educational institutions; some, along with certain tribal leaders hold power of life and death over their followers, and the government dare not interfere.

But the essence of Islam remains progressive, and the modernists steadily strengthen their secular position by building on Islam and not destroying it.

Several sizeable non-Muslim ethnic groups live and work in Afghanistan.

Historically, the Hindus played an important role in shaping the destiny of Afghanistan, especially in the eastern and southern areas. The Mauryan Empire spread into Afghanistan during the fourth and third centuries B.C.; another great dynasty, the Gupta, controlled parts of Afghanistan in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. The militant Hindu Shahi kings ruled parts of Afghanistan in the eighth to tenth centuries A.D., and some Afghan Hindus claim Hindu Shahi ancestry.

Two groups of Indian origin currently exist: about 200 Indian nationals, and 25,000 Afghan nationals, by their own estimates. Most engage in commercial activities. In modern times, the first 10 Hindu merchants came to Kabul about 65 years ago. The group grew perceptibly larger after the 1947 Partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan. The migrants worked previously in the region now known as West Pakistan, and most lost their businesses in the wake of the communal riots, which racked the area following the partition.

Sikhs, however, constitute the majority (about. 15,000) of Afghan nationals of Indian origin. Like the Hindus, they primarily engage in commercial activities, and few Afghan towns exist without their quota of Hindu and Sikh businessmen. The Sikhs generally exhibit the "five K’s," though somewhat modified in form, of warrior (akali) Sikhdom and maintain their ethnic identity: the protective, thick, long, uncut hair (kesh) held with a comb (kangha) and the distinctive shorts (kachaba) remain the same, but the two weapons, kirpan (two-edged dagger or sword) and khakra (steel quoit, 5" to 12" in diameter and worn, in the turban), have become diminutive. The Sikh businessmen of At ghanistan wear a miniature silver kirpan around their necks and a steel bracelet (kara) on the left wrist as a possible substitute for the deadly quoit. The "five K’s" have also undergone miniaturization among the Sikh business community in India.

Both Hindus and Sikhs actively practice their respective religions and maintain their distinctive temples. Most still speak Hindi or Punjabi.

Indian nationals operate under an Afghan—Indian barter agreement. Afghan nationals of Indian extraction, however, work under Afghan laws, and sometimes suffer discrimination of varying degrees in government offices. Their young men perform national service, but while on active duty, Sikhs are permitted to wear the "five K’s."

Small Jewish (Yahudi) business communities with active synagogues exist in Kabul, Herat, and Qandahar. Many Jews initially immigrated to Israel, but most returned because of the discrimination they and other Sephardic and oriental Jews suffered under the dominant European Ashkenazim. Many have since emigrated to the U.S.A.

To my knowledge, only a few Parsee (Zoroastrians) businessmen live and work in the Indian commercial community.

Since, legally, the Afghan government wisely permits no proselytizing, only rarely do Afghan Christians surface.


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